In recent years Russell´s view that there are singular propositions, namely propositions that contain the individuals they are about, has gained followers. As a response to a number of puzzles about attitude ascriptions several Russellians (as I will call those who accept the view that proper names and indexicals only contribute their referents to the propositions expressed by the sentences in which they 
proposition expressed by "Hesperus is Phosphorus" when the two sentences express the same proposition? If someone is tempted to think that the problem is unique to identity statements it is quickly pointed out that Lois may have one attitude towards the proposition expressed by "Superman is magnificent" and a different attitude towards the proposition expressed by "Clark Kent is magnificent," where the two sentences express the same proposition. Nor is the problem limited to instances where two names are used to refer to the same object, for, as shown by Saul Kripke, the same problem can be raised using a single unambiguous name. 4 Furthermore, it can be raised in the absence of names via indexicals or demonstratives, as when I have one attitude towards the proposition expressed by "You look untidy"
and a different attitude towards the proposition expressed by "I look untidy," not realizing that I am looking at my own reflection in a mirror.
Any attempt to deal with attitude ascriptions of the type the Russellians are struggling with has to take into account our intuitions about the following:
1. Informativeness of propositions expressed by sentences containing names or indexicals,
2.
Truth values of belief ascriptions,
Sharing of beliefs.
There is little or no disagreement about (1) . In most cases it is fairly obvious whether or not a given proposition is informative. The problem lies in how to theoretically account for its informativeness; an issue that takes us well beyond our intuitions. The Russellian works on the assumption that the semantic value of a name or an indexical is its referent and, at first glance, that does not seem to leave room for modes of presentation which might explain the informativeness of propositions expressed by sentences containing those names or indexicals. 5 There is considerable disagreement about (2) . Consider the following assertions about the Babylonian astronomer Hammurabi; 6 4. Hammurabi believes that Hesperus is a planet
5.
Hammurabi believes that Phosphorus is a planet.
Hammurabi assents to the embedded sentence in (4) but dissents from the embedded sentence in (5) since he does not know that Hesperus is Phosphorus. What is the truth value of (5)? We can try to resort to the pretheoretical intuitions of the laymen. Gottlob Frege did just that and presented us with a theory according to which (5) is false. On the other hand, Russellians who claim that the embedded sentences in (4) and (5) express the same singular proposition have a hard time accounting for the pretheoretical intuition that (4) might be true while (5) is false.
There should not be much disagreement about the third item. It seems intuitively obvious that two or more persons not only can share a belief, or belief the same thing, but that we frequently share beliefs. We thus should make it a mandatory requirement for any theory of belief and belief ascriptions that it account for the relative ease with which we share beliefs. Traditionally, the sharing of beliefs is accounted for in terms of two or more persons believing the same proposition. Thus, a Russellian might claim that two persons believe the same thing or share a belief if they believe the same singular proposition, and a Fregean might make the same claim about general propositions. But Richard's theory makes it a virtual impossibility to share beliefs and the theory therefore cannot account for the relative ease with which we share beliefs.
II
Richard takes as a starting point of his theory of belief ascriptions our intuition which tells us that (4) is true and (5) under correlation f iff f maps every annotation in RAM 1 to its image in RAM 2 . RAM (7) would represent RAM (8) under correlation a iff a mapped <'is a planet', being a planet> to <'is a planet', being a planet>, and <'Hesperus', Hesperus> to <'Phosphorus', Hesperus>.
What we have so far is not sufficient to account for the pretheoretical intuition that (4) might be true while (5) is false, for we can surely find a correlation that maps the annotation in (7) to the annotations in (8) . In order to obtain the wanted results Richard treats 'believes' is an indexical, so whether or not a belief ascription is true or false depends on the context in which it is uttered. Different In one context I might therefore be able to truly report that Hammurabi believes that Phosphorus is the heavenly body seen latest in the morning (this might include contexts involving a conversation with people who only use 'Phosphorus' as a name of Venus), while this would constitute a false report in other contexts. This allows Richard to claim that (4) can be true while (5) is false. Thus, our pretheoretical intuitions about the truth of belief reports are satisfied.
The restrictions that apply in a given context are typically the results of the shared intentions of those participating in a conversation. In some contexts speakers might be interested in quite a bit of detail of the proposition the agent bears an attitude to, as when they want to account for 
III
Hammurabi's contemporary, the Danish astronomer Petersen, assented to what turned out to be a direct translation of the that-clause in (4), so the following is true:
Petersen tror Morgenstjernen er en planet.
Since belief ascriptions are partly tied up with the sentences that express them Petersen does not have a token of (7) on his mental blackboard. Instead he has the RAM 10. <<'er en planet', being a planet>, <'Morgenstjernen', Hesperus>>, so Hammurabi and Petersen do not have the same RAM in their representational systems.
Let us go back to our pretheoretical intuitions. They tell us that (4) is true and (5) is false. They also tell us that (9) is true. They furthermore tell us that Hammurabi and Petersen have the same belief or share a belief. So, if we take our pretheoretical intuitions seriously, as Richard does, there should be some sense in which the two share a belief.
It is insufficient to say that they share a belief because they believe the same Russellian proposition, since it would undermine the intuition Richard is trying to respect. Richard developed his fine grained account of propositions partly to account for the intuition that (4) can be true while (5) is false. If he resorts to claiming that they share a belief because they believe the same Russellian proposition he is giving up that intuition, since if Hammurabi has the same belief in (4) and (5) we have no reason to claim one to be true and the other false.
An attempt to amend the account above by saying that they share a belief because the propositions believed contain the same Russellian core, namely <being a planet, Hesperus>, does not work since it, too, involves giving up the subjectivity Richard is after. If we accept this amendment we would have to say that Hammurabi has the same belief in (4) and (5).
Richard can try to account for the sharing of belief by saying that even though Petersen does not have RAM (7) in his representational system, RAM (7) can nevertheless represent one of Petersen's RAMs given the right correlations. Given the correlation that 'Hesperus' conventionally translates as 'Morgenstjernen' and 'is a planet' conventionally translates as 'er en planet', RAM (7) represents one of Petersen's RAMs. 10 Since RAM (7) This revision raises a problem for the account of sharing of belief. We were able to say that
Hammurabi and Petersen had the same belief because we could correlate the annotations in RAMs (7) and (10) . But now we see that names are not parts of RAMs; representations are parts of RAMs. While we were dealing with the linguistic account of RAMs we were dealing with public linguistic items. What was of importance when accounting for the truth of belief reports was, in essence, finding out whether any permitted correlations allowed us to map public language items in annotation onto other public language items. But with the representational account of RAMs the emphasis is on how the person who's belief is being reported represents or thinks about an object. We have gone from public objects to private objects.
Given this, how can we correlate the annotations in Hammurabi's and Petersen's RAMs? We cannot say as before that RAM (7) represents RAMs for both persons since RAM (7) consists partially of names while we now know that the names in RAMs have been replaced with representations. Instead of annotations containing linguistic items they contain representations, which we can indicate by following a linguistic item with a star, so the linguistic item 'is a planet' in an annotation is replaced with the representation 'is a planet*'. So, the that-clause in (4) now names the RAM 11. <<'is a planet*', being a planet>, <'Hesperus*', Hesperus>> which indicates that we are dealing with representations instead of linguistic items. Correspondingly, the that-clause in (9) names the RAM
12.
<<'er en planet*', being a planet>, <'Morgenstjernen*', Hesperus>>.
Richard does not say much about the nature of these representations, but he allows that they are, for example, something like images acquired through perception. 12 Given that, two things are clear; first, that whatever linguistic item we use to represent the representation does not tell us much at all about the nature of the representation itself, i.e., whether the representation itself is linguistic in nature, an image, or perhaps something else. And second, even though two people have a representation of the same kind, for example an image, of the same object, the representations themselves need not be alike. I might know a woman as a loving mother and homemaker and represent her accordingly; someone else might know the same woman as an exotic dancer and represent her accordingly; and a third person might have known her only as a child and represent her accordingly.
Suppose we try to proceed as before and find a correlation that maps the appropriate annotations in RAM (11) onto the appropriate annotations in RAM (12) . Remember that a correlation only has to preserve reference. It does not have to preserve representation. Given that, and given how unlike two representations of the same object can be, a correlation from the annotations in one RAM to the annotations in a second RAM tells us at most that the two RAMs contain representations of the same object. That there is a correlation between the annotations tells us nothing about how like or unlike the representations are. It does not even tell us whether the representations are of the same kind, or whether one is, for example, imagistic while another is linguistic. And since it is not a sufficient condition for two persons sharing belief that both have a representation of the same object, a correlation between Hammurabi's and Petersen's relevant RAMs is not sufficient for them sharing belief. 13 Richard briefly discusses two sorts of conditions, "outside" and "inside" conditions, that together would be necessary and sufficient for two tokens to determine the same representation. 14 The
"outside" conditions include as a necessary condition for two tokens to determine the same representation that they be of the same thing, and that they be a part of the same causal chain of transmission. Thus, 'Aristotle' will not determine the same representation when it names the shipping magnate as it does when it names the philosopher, and 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' do not determine the same representation because they are a part of different chains of transmission. The "inside" condition Richard discusses is a "recognition condition. Unfortunately, Richard's discussion of necessary and sufficient conditions for tokens to determine the same representation does not help us with Hammurabi and Petersen. The "inside"
conditions he discusses do not apply when our concern is with representations of two people. They only apply when a person is determining whether to file incoming data as if they were of the same thing. And the "outside" condition that it is necessary for two tokens to be of the same word type in order for them to determine the same representation does not help either. The reason that it does not help has already been discussed, namely that representations of the same object can vary greatly, so it is clearly not a sufficient reason for two name tokens to determine the same representation that they name the same thing. Richard clearly agrees with this, for otherwise he would not impose "inside" conditions of sameness in addition to the "outside" conditions. Given the great variety in which we can be acquainted with most objects, the chance of two people representing the same object in the exact same way becomes a virtual impossibility.
The fact of the matter is that agents can and do form different representations of the same object. Someone might say that violating the pretheoretical intuitions about having the same belief is a small price to pay for an otherwise elegant theory. But more has to be done. While Richard respected our pretheoretical intuitions about the truth values of belief ascriptions, not only does he not respect them when it comes to our intuitions about sharing beliefs, he also is unable to give us any convincing account within his theoretic framework of people sharing beliefs.
Furthermore, now we see that on Richard's final account of belief ascriptions the truth/falsity of belief ascriptions depends partly upon the believer's representation of the object in the proposition; a representation that is hidden from everyone except the believer. Since the truth of belief ascriptions now depends partly upon a representation that is hidden from everyone except the believer, it becomes impossible to judge whether or not a belief report is true except in contexts where no restrictions apply, that is, except in contexts where we are only concerned with to which Russellian proposition the agent bears an attitude. Judgments in contexts involving restrictions would involve RAM probing, i.e., looking at the elements in a given RAM, and since RAMs now contain representations instead of linguistic items they are essentially private. The simple fact that Richard's theory prevents us from judging, with good conscience, the truth values of simple belief reports and belief ascriptions is enough to make his theory suspect. There is a lesson to be learned from this failure and the lesson is that we better not include representations in propositions. If we are to successfully account for puzzles involving belief reports, such as the Paderewski puzzle or the Hammurabi puzzle, we need to resort to other means than enrich propositions with representations. The two options that come to mind as alternatives are to account for the puzzles in the Salmon/Soames way of intruducing ways of believing propositions, or to introduce a third element into the belief relation and make the third element a psychological attachment/association speakers make with names. Both alternatives avoid representations that take us beyond singular
propositions.
